Victor D. Cha and Ramón Pacheco: "The war in Ukraine has saved the North Korean regime."

In the early hours of August 10, 1945, an emergency meeting took place in John McCloy 's Pentagon office. The USSR, which had declared war on Japan just two days earlier, after the bombs had already been dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, was advancing on the Korean Peninsula. Unlike US troops, who were more than 1,000 km away on the island of Okinawa in Japan, Stalin only had to cross the border that had separated the two countries for centuries. Something had to be done quickly, and the idea was to divide the peninsula to buy time and prevent the Red Army from occupying it entirely. John Mcloy then asked Colonels Charles H. Bonesteel and Dean Rusk to quickly draw a line dividing the country: they had 30 minutes.

The two retreated to an adjoining office to search for a dividing line as far north as the Soviets would accept , realizing that U.S. troops would be helpless if the Russians reached Seoul, as Dean Rusk later recalled, – Draft Memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. July 12, 1950. National Archives–. Under great pressure, Bonesteel pulled out a National Geographic map in an attempt to find a line that would keep the capital in the U.S. zone. And since he couldn’t find an easily identifiable geographic marker, he spotted the 38th parallel and proposed it as a line to temporarily divide the country.

In the rush, the border proposed by the US and incredibly accepted by Stalin did not take into account the relief of Korea . The border arbitrarily divided many geographical features: more than seventy-five streams, twelve rivers, more than three hundred local roads, eight highways and six railway lines, as Victor D. Cha and Ramon Pacheco Pardo describe in the fascinating Korea: A New History of South and North (Ático de los Libros) published this week. The line is the last division that exists on the planet, a result of the Second World War, the 80th anniversary of whose end is being marked these months. But even more incredible is that it coincides precisely with another demarcation, the one devised in 1904 between Japan and China as a means to divide the country and also protect themselves from Russia, the other omnipresent power in the history of Korea, a boxed-in country that paradoxically found its independence with the division of 1945.

In that same decade, the US entered into a secret Taft-Katsura Agreement with Japan following the end of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), under which Washington renounced the Korean Peninsula in exchange for Japan respecting the US zone of influence in the Philippines. As is well known, everything blew up in 1942 with the attack on Pearl Harbor, and after the victory over Japan, the West's focus had to turn to Korea due to the Soviet threat. After a forgotten three-year war (1950-1953) that initiated the period of blockades and ultimately had more consequences than Vietnam, the two countries eventually stabilized.

Now, unification seems impossible after North Korea, an anachronistic and brutal dictatorship, endured the collapse of the Soviet bloc—and even more so the Covid crisis—while South Korea became a super-economy, a world leader, after embracing the influence of the hated Japan in the 1980s, which had colonized them for three decades, trying to erase their national and cultural identity. Both countries were successful in their own way: North Korea by manufacturing weapons , the same ones Putin now relies on to wage war with Ukraine, and South Korea with its democracy and incredible economic growth, now threatened by the tariffs proposed by Donald Trump. El Confidencial spoke about all this in Madrid with the authors, Victor D. Cha, former director of Asian Affairs on the White House National Security Council during the Biden administration, and Ramón Pacheco Pardo, professor of International Relations at King's College and KF VUB Chair of Korea at the Free University of Brussels.

Both countries were successful in their own ways: North Korea by manufacturing weapons, the same ones Putin now relies heavily on.

QUESTION. The division of the country has become the final frontier of World War II , surpassing even the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet bloc. People often talk about the two Spains here because of the legacy of the Civil War, but it's clearly the same. After 80 years, do both Koreas represent the same people? Do Koreans really want unification?

VICTOR D. CHA. For South Koreans, North Korea and the division of the Korean Peninsula are not a significant issue: the only Korea they know in practice is South Korea. Indeed, the war that divided the country is merely a part of history books, but what we have discovered is that, for North Koreans, a strong sense of ethnic identity with their neighbors persists. Surveys of defectors consistently show that they continue to view Korea as a single nation and maintain a positive attitude toward unification. In contrast, among South Koreans—particularly younger ones—this idea does not generate the same enthusiasm; they are ambivalent or simply don't think about it.

Q. It's actually very different from what happened in Vietnam or Germany...

VC Yes, it's true that Korea has been completely separated and isolated. While Germans could watch television on the other side or even travel, in the Korean case, that's not possible. Therefore, as the book suggests, the Korean peninsula resembles a social science experiment: you take the same people, with the same ethnic identity, and place them under two radically different political and economic systems to observe the results...

Q. A very interesting aspect of the book is that in the West, we have a dictatorial perception of North Korea, but after the war, South Korea evolved from a democracy to the dictatorship of Park Chung Hee , who modernized the country after a self-coup in 1972, and just last December, Yoon Suk-yeol's coup lasted six hours. Does this show that it's a fragile democracy or, on the contrary, that it's very resilient? Is it an indication of what could happen to other democracies now that there's talk of crisis and the rise of authoritarianism?

RAMÓN PACHECO PARDO. I think it ultimately showed strength in the sense that, as you point out, it only lasted six hours. I was in Korea right at the moment it was happening, and I was interviewed on CNN about four hours later, and I said, "This isn't going to last." And two hours later, it was all over. It's not that I was a genius, but knowing today's Korea, I knew it wasn't going to last. What happened? The president, who we all know had a very close circle, did think that today's Korea might still aspire to return to that past represented, as you say, by Park Chung-hee, but it was immediately clear that wasn't the case. We saw the National Assembly vote against it, the Constitutional Court's decision, 8 to 0, in favor of Yoon Suk Yeol being unable to continue in power, and the protests and polls with 70-80% of the population completely against it. What is certain is that it showed that there is a segment that grew up in the 60s, 70s and even 80s that did think about going back in time.

VC For me, this is another example of that social science experiment that is Korea. What happens if you take a democratically elected leader and he tries to use instruments from the martial law of the past? The public reaction was extremely negative. There was a huge amount of widespread outrage. For the younger generation, in fact, it was inconceivable. They asked: What is martial law? Many probably didn't even know what it was. And then we saw—and I think it was Ramón who said it—how the institutions managed to manage the crisis effectively. It was a test for democracy, but it also showed that democratic institutions in Korea are strong. But it was certainly very interesting because indeed, in other parts of the world, democracy is being tested, it's in retreat. Even in my own country, the United States , democracy is in retreat. So it's heartening to see a case where democratic institutions are showing resilience and are able to prevent damaging changes from taking place.

"What happens if you take a democratically elected leader and try to use martial law instruments?"

Q. One of the book's central themes is the Korean issue within the geostrategic framework of the great powers. It occurred at the beginning of the century with Japan's invasion and annexation in 1910 and the disputes with China and Russia, and again after World War II as the major point of friction between the two Cold War blocs. Is this a similar situation in the current context of instability? What can be expected from the role of both countries in the current crisis?

VC One of the big differences is that Korea is a much stronger country today than it was back then. At the end of the 19th century, Korea was deeply divided and lacked a significant economy; the monarchy was corrupt, and numerous problems existed. Although political divisions persist today, Korea is a strong country, both economically and militarily. What is certain is that we are facing a crucial moment with the elections scheduled for June, as the outcome will have a direct impact on the geopolitics of the region. If a progressive government more aligned with China prevails, it will influence regional geopolitical strategy. Conversely, if a conservative government more aligned with the United States and with trilateral relations between the United States, Japan, and Korea wins, geopolitical dynamics will also be affected. However, perhaps the most significant change in the geopolitics of both Europe and Asia has been the alliance between North Korea and Russia. No one anticipated this scenario. Before the war in Ukraine, it was unimaginable that something like this could happen. It began as a tactical relationship—Putin needed more ammunition—but has evolved into a strategic alliance. This relationship is affecting the security of Europe and Asia, as well as U.S. interests in both regions.

RP First, NATO is working more with South Korea : the EU, European countries, even Spain, with which we have signed a strategic agreement. It's not a dead letter in the sense that we see Korean investment here in Spain that was unthinkable in the past. We also see now that South Korea is selling weapons to Poland, the Nordic countries, and Eastern European countries. It's a turning point in history; for several centuries, it was European countries that went to Asia, and now it's the other way around: North Korea has aligned itself with Russia, China, and Iran, and South Korea with the United States, with Europe, with Japan, and with Australia. This is also new: the South is aligning itself with countries with which it previously had relations, but not at this level of proximity.

Q. Korea's history with Japan is traumatic, on the one hand, with the invasion in the 20th century, the Comfort Women issue, and other atrocities committed by the Empire of the Rising Sun, and at the same time, South Korea benefited from their rapprochement in the 1980s. Has it now surpassed them in terms of economic and cultural influence?

RP Yes, that's a good question. It's true that in the past, many Koreans did feel they weren't on the same level as Japan, and, well, they weren't on the same economic, developmental, or cultural level, but today they see it as equals. And that's a pretty important difference among most South Koreans. South Korea's GDP per capita is higher than Japan's, and in fact, it's a concern for them. And of course, the inferiority complex they carried throughout the 20th century no longer exists. In terms of influence, South Korea is obviously more important in defense. It's exporting to many more countries. If we focus on semiconductors, electric batteries, and the naval sector, South Korea exports more. There are certain levels, certain highly technological sectors in which it clearly surpasses. Then there's indeed culture. I experienced that in South Korea, as I explain in the book, in 2003-2004, which is when Korean culture began to have influence beyond Asia. But back then, it was more focused on Latin America and the Middle East; it hadn't reached Europe or the United States, but today it has. I think it's surpassed Japan, in the sense that manga remains its biggest cultural export, from my point of view, but it's stagnated, while Korea exports a lot of film, literature, pop music...

VC: Well, I would clarify some aspects. Technology, semiconductor chips, batteries, automobiles, steel... There's a lot of talk right now about US-Korea cooperation in shipbuilding, as the US faces serious problems in that sector. However, there are aspects related to Japan that remain extremely important to the US, even if they're not as prominent in public discourse. For one thing, Japan holds a large amount of US debt; a significant portion of US Treasury bonds are held by Japan, which is reassuring for the US government, given that it's a close ally. It's not as reassuring if that debt is held by China, but it is if it's held by Japan. That's a key factor. Another key aspect is that, in the event of a conflict in the Taiwan Strait, the most important partner for the US would be Japan. This is due to the physical proximity of US military bases in Japan to Taiwan. The islands in southwest Japan are practically within the Taiwan Strait; they're right there. Therefore, in both the context of China and Russia, Japan is a key strategic ally for the United States, due to the length of its island chain. These kinds of considerations aren't often discussed outside of Washington, D.C. , but within the political sphere of the US capital, this is precisely why Japan continues to be considered a country of great relevance and influence.

Q. In the West, the view of North Korea is that of an anachronistic, Stalinist regime, which would certainly prevent any unification. Is this really the case? Why didn't the regime fall? What significance does it have now?

VC: I believe the situation in North Korea is as serious as it is often described. It is. The North Korean regime is one of the most extreme and autocratic in the world today. Concentrating all national resources on weapons development, rather than on the economy or society, clearly reflects its orientation. Therefore, yes, I believe the situation is as critical as it seems. North Korea has benefited enormously from the war in Ukraine. This conflict has completely transformed the North Korean economy, its foreign policy, and its strategic alliances. In many ways, the war in Ukraine saved the regime's survival. Looking at the previous context, the last time we saw Kim Jong-un publicly before the war was during the failed summit with Donald Trump in February 2019 in Vietnam. It was their second meeting, and Trump abruptly walked out, declaring that there was no agreement. This represented a great humiliation for Kim Jong-un, probably the most serious a North Korean leader has ever suffered. Even during the Cold War, when Kim Il-sung met with Stalin, even though Stalin ridiculed him in private, in public they maintained an image of unity and strength. What happened with Trump, on the other hand, was a public humiliation. After that episode, the COVID-19 pandemic hit. North Korea remained in extreme lockdown for three and a half years. Kim Jong-un not only lost prestige, but the economy collapsed. During that time, there was no trade with China or other countries. When they finally emerged from lockdown, the country was in a very delicate situation.

But then war broke out in Ukraine, and Russia needed ammunition. North Korea, according to estimates, has earned between six and twenty billion dollars in foreign currency thanks to its participation in the war. Billions. In addition, it has received large quantities of oil, food, and energy from Russia. Added to this is the resumption of trade with China. Therefore, the most significant geopolitical impact on the Korean Peninsula in recent years has undoubtedly been the war in Ukraine.